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Depending on the source, one may find that Guatemala’s civil war caused over 200,000 deaths 
throughout its 35 year-long civil war. In its neighbor, El Salvador, the twelve year-long civil war 
caused over 100,000 deaths and, alike virtually every other armed conflict in Latin America, in both 
cases the states were responsible for most of these deaths as well as for an atrocious large share of 
human rights violations (Ball, Kobrak, Spirer, 1999, Nasi 2002). Despite these striking numbers, both 
wars ended in a political settlement between the rebel groups and their respective states after a six 
year-long peace process for Guatemala, and a two year-long process for El Salvador. In light of these 
facts, one may be inclined to think these processes lasted for as long as they did perhaps because of the 
length of each civil war and the number of deaths caused by it. Furthermore, one can even imagine the 
moral difficulties and political haziness that each negotiation entailed since the profound social, 
political and economic issues that caused the wars in the first place must have been discussed in 
addition to the gross amount of human rights violations. That last aspect of the negotiations is 
precisely the subject of this paper. Specifically, it aims at understanding and explaining the extent to 
which the discussion, management and agreement upon human rights and human rights violations 
affected the speed of each negotiation process. Put differently, the question that this paper seeks to 
answer is: How did the discussion, management and agreements upon human rights violations affected 
the speed of the negotiations processes of El Salvador (1989-1992) and Guatemala (1991-1996)? 
Based on the analyses of these cases, this paper provides evidence to consider the issue of human 
rights as a relevant factor to understand the speed of peace negotiations. First, placing human rights as 
the first item in the agenda had a distinguishable impact on the pace of both negotioations: the 
Guatemalan peace negotiation’s pace changed substantially once this issue was cleared. By contrast, 
althought human rights did have the first place in the agenda of negotiation of El Salvador, failure to 
come to a final agreement over this issue caused the parties to spread out its discussion throughout the 
entire process which, in turn, significantly slowed it down. Second, the evidence provided by this 
paper suggests that the speed of the negotiations depends to a great extent on the necessary agreements 
to address human rights violations and perpetrators. In both cases issues such as dismantling death 
squads or reforming the army caused the negotiations to deadlock several times. It could even be 
argued that no other issue affected the processes’ speed like this one; not even those that are closer 
related to the causes of both civil wars. Finally, there is mixed evidence for the impact that acts of 
good will or trust-building with regard to human rights –or their opposite- had on the speed of these 
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processes: while they seem to have an effect in Guatemala’s peace negotiations -although marginal if 
compared to the other causes, the same logic seems to apply in El Salvador’s. The extent to which this 
approach to peace negotiations can be replicated is succintly discussed in Appendinx A. 
As it can be inferred from the summary of the findings above presented, here it will be argued that the 
changes in the speed of the processes highlight the role that human rights played for both cases. For 
example, while Guatemalan and Salvadorian human rights violations records explain the attention and 
efforts invested in both countries’ conflict by the international community as well as the pressure that 
it exerted in both countries to reach an agreement in this regard (Bar-Yaacov, 1995), there were more 
powerful reasons to do so. For one thing, it would not have made any sense for the rebels to reach an 
agreement if human rights were not guarateed by a formal, internationally watched, agreement. 
Second, in order to respect and provide guarantees for human rights as well as to neutralize human 
rights violations, each case required a profound institutional change. Without this change, human 
rights violations and perpetrators would have remained active within the institutional framework of 
each state. 
For these reasons, this paper aims to understand the extent to which the particular mechanisms used to 
cope with human rights violations affected or not the pace of peace negotiations. It will particularly 
dwell in three mechanisms. First it will investigate whether placing and effectively negotiating human 
rights as the first topic in the agenda affected the dependent variable, that is, the speed of the 
negotiations. Second, it will examinte the extent to which agreeing to stop, neutralize, dismantle and 
sanction human rights violations and perpetrators affected the negotiations’ pace. Lastly, it will 
analyze if eventual acts of good will or their opposite vis-à-vis human rights played a significant role 
in the process’ speed. 
The paper procedes as follows: The following section will provide the reader with a short theoretical 
and methodological discussion that aims at explaining why it is both necessary and possible to still 
draw lessons from both cases. The third section discusses the case of Guatemala. It first addresses the 
causes and orgins of the civil war, followed by the description and analysis of the cases’ bargaining 
rounds. The fourth section analyses and discusses the case of El Salvador in the same fashion. The 
fifth section provides a comparison of the findings of both cases and evaluates the hypotheses here 
proposed. The last section provides a few recommendations for policy based on the lessons drawn 
from both cases. 
Theoretical Features and Methodological Approach  
Broadly speaking, peace negotiations are characterized by uncertainty from the beginning to the end 
however fast or slow they move. To begin with, it is almost never certain whether peace talks -where 
warring parties make an initial approach to evaluate the possibility of ending the conflict through a 
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negotiated settlement- can actually derive in peace negotiations. Among other reasons, peace usually 
poses a threat to the interests of specific groups or sectors who only maximize their benefits in a 
context of war. For this reason, these groups often seek to sabotage and destroy peace talks to prevent 
a peaceful settlement from taking place (see Stedman 2000; Kydd and Walter 2002, Nasi 2007). 
Furthermore, even if negotiations start under ideal circumstances and processes are spoiler-proof, it is 
often the case that the techniques and styles employed in the negotiations need to be constantly 
revisited provided the nature of the topics that need to be discussed (Zartman 1995). For example, 
sudden changes of mind and emotional tones at the bargaining table or switching from minimalist to 
maximalist demands may cause critical variations in the negotiations’ momentum and outcome (see 
Fogg 1985). In sum, although the structures and agencies that a peace negotiation entails can be 
identified, their variation is key to understand and explain the process’ ending.   
The literature on conflict resolution has made remarkable progress in understanding why peace 
negotiations go the way they go. In fact, the concepts and discussion of the factors that help to explain 
the bargaining successes is exhaustive: Zartman (2000; 2001) has pointed out that the cause of the 
conflict, the timing and the state of the warring parties prior to negotiations can determine to some 
extent the chances of having successful outcomes: when parties see themselves locked in a conflict 
which they cannot win and this gridlock is hurtful for all of them, they seek an alternative policy. 
Furthermore, Walter (1997) has suggested that civil wars in which an outside power stepped in to 
guarantee a peace agreement are more likely to succeed
1
 as opposed to those settlements that had no 
international intervention. Additional empirical evidence for this suggestion has been offered by case-
studies in which a third international party has intervened in order to develop trust and commitment 
among the parties involved in a peace process (see Weiss-Fagen, 1996). Walter’s (2009) work has 
addressed in a comparative manner cases in which bargaining has failed or succeeded, and has 
considered additional factors as probable causes such as asymmetries of information at the bargaining 
table or commitment problems. Others (Wriggins 1995) have addressed the issue of indivisible stakes 
or issues over which warring parties are not willing to make concessions as a key factor to understand 
why bargaining rounds stall or fail. In sum, the literature focused on understanding peace negotiations 
and their outcomes is quite rich in and provides a number of theoretical options for recognizing, 
understanding and explaining the phenomenon of peace negotiations. 
The discussion provided in the following pages seeks to make a three-fold contribution to this 
literature: a) First and foremost, it seeks to broaden our general understanding of the importance of 
human rights violations from a perspective yet not sufficiently explored, that is, their role in the speed 
of peace negotiations; b) by drawing lessons from two emblematic cases of peace negotiations in Latin 
America, it seeks to understand the extent to which handling human rights violations perpetrators, 
                                                 
1
 The extent to which a peace negotiation can be considered successful is still a matter of debate. See Nasi 2002, particularly Volume I.  
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causes or mechanisms constitutes a divisive issue; and c) it will attempt to become a forceful tool for 
policy regarding conflict resolution among contexts in which human rights violations became the 
central issue. Put differently, the importance of this proposal stems from its potential to contribute to 
our understanding of peace negotiations and human rights violations both theoretically and empirically, 
and from its potential to become a tool for policy formulation within the framework of human rights 
violations. 
By looking at the speed with which negotiations are conducted it may be possible to understand the 
care, attention, divisiveness, or importance that any given issue had for the parties. The rationale 
behind this assumption is straightforward: any topic agreed upon without major aggravations is 
possibly one for which for both parties it was relatively easy to divide stakes; by contrast, any topic 
that leads to a deadlock –and hence slows down the negotiations’ pace- must be a topic for which one 
or both warring parties seek sole ownership. It may also turn out to be the case that these indivisible 
issues could be different from those which allegedly caused the war in the first place. Findings in this 
direction can gain us a richer understanding of the conflict, and the rationale behind the strategies 
perused by the negotiating parties during peace negotiations.  
Speed of Negotiations: In general terms, the speed of any negotiation could be understood as the 
amount of time that a given process requires to cover every item included in the agenda of negotiation. 
This means that the speed of a negotiation process is inherently relative, possessing no objective 
standard of comparison. In that sense, it could be proposed that an intuitive measure for speed could 
be the process’ ratio between the number of issues covered and the time used to cover issues. But then 
again, this measure only indicates how much time it took to negotiate topics on average; it does not 
tell us whether some items took much longer than others or if the process as such went on schedule. 
And since the contention of this paper is that certain topics in the agenda affect the speed of the 
process more than others, a substitute measure is needed. 
An alternative solution, then, could be to look at every item or topic of the negotiation’s agenda and 
examine separately their progress. An in-depth analysis in this direction may explain the process’ 
speed vis-á-vis the topics discussed: it could account for gridlocks as a result of either complicated 
discussions about a particular item or simply having too many sub-items to be discussed. Furthermore, 
by looking at the moments in which the negotiation of certain topic took too long to be agreed upon it 
is possible to identify when and why the negotiation stalled. It would allow to analyze in detail 
whether or not the negotiation stalled due to the potential conflictive nature of the topic that was being 
discussed. Simply put then, a fair measure to indicate whether a topic influenced the speed of 
negotiations is by looking at the moments in which no progress (time-wise) could be made.  
In order to accurately observe the speed of the peace negotiations here proposed, an exhaustive 
research of primary and secondary sources was done. These sources include NGO’s reports, Truth 
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Commission reports, scholar and journalistic articles. The aforementioned sources were utilized to 
construct a comprehensive and exhaustive summary of the bargaining rounds here discussed. 
Moreover, they were analyzed in order to assess the speed with which the issues concerning human 
rights violations were addressed. The data gathered allowed to perform an analysis of the causes of 
gridlocks vis-à-vis the management human rights violations during the process. In short, this analysis a) 
established with certainty lags or forward movements caused by the discussion about human rights 
violations in the cases observed; and b) provided observations of the dependent variable’s variation in 
each case. 
Undoubtedly, there are number of reasons as to why a peace negotiation stalls and they need not to be 
related to human rights violations. In fact, as the literature and case-studies over indivisible issues 
shows, negotiations often stall and fail over the issues that caused the war in the first place such as 
land, ideology or ethnicity (see Hassner 2003). The contention of this paper is precisely to show that to 
some extent the issue of human rights and human rights violations has an effect on peace negotiations 
and that it can be observed in the speed of the cases below analyzed. As it will be shown below, 
despite the fact that lots of articles and books have been dedicated to the cases of Guatemala and El 
Salvador, there are still lessons to draw from them. To this end, this paper will discuss three variables 
extracted from the cases and the literature over conflict resolution that may explain in greater detail the 
relationship between handling human rights/human rights violations and the speed of the peace 
processes. 
Before moving on to the discussion about the independent variables here considered, it should be first 
discussed what here is understood by human rights and human rights violations. The definition of the 
human rights embraced in this paper goes is exactly that of the rights consigned in the second chapter 
(Civil and Political Rights) of the American Convention on Human Rights, adopted at the Inter-
American Specialized Conference on Human Rights in 1969, agreed upon and ratified by twenty five 
American nations, including Guatemala and El Salvador (Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights)
2
. Hence this paper understands a) human rights violations as those actions that infringe those 
rights; and b) addressing human rights (and human rights violations) as the attempt to restore or secure 
those same rights.   
Working Hypotheses 
The centrality of human rights in the peace negotiations of El Salvador and Guatemala can be 
understood from its rank in both agendas of negotiation. Although it is widely argued (see below) that 
both civil wars started because of these countries’ profound economic, ethnic, and political exclusion, 
it was the issue of human rights the one that was brought to the bargaining table before any other. 
                                                 
2
 Corte Interamericana. Convención de los Derechos Humanos   
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm  
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Furthermore, it is maintained that it was precisely El Salvador and Guatemala’s poor performance on 
human rights that international intervention took place (Bar-Yaacov 1995: Dogget and Kircher 2005).  
While the issue’s rank in the agenda can explain its importance to the parts involved, it does not fully 
account for its relevance and consequences to the negotiation as a whole. One way to evaluate the 
extent of its significance is by examining whether due to eventual disagreements or strategies of 
negotiation attempts to bypass it or postpone it still allowed the process to continue. There are reasons 
to expect that if the topic of human rights is ranked first in the agenda of negotiations other issues may 
not be discussed unless there is a settlement in this regard. For one thing, it is usually in the discussion 
of this particular issue where military might as well as criminal convictions for its past or present 
misconducts with regard human rights is negotiated. These consequences clearly affect the power 
correlation and morale of warring parties and hence their negotiation capacity. Since insurgents are 
often the weaker party and the one who gains more in this case of compromises (as it was the case in 
both countries) they will refuse to move on and discuss different topics if there is no settlement vis-à-
vis human rights. And, because this sort of settlement affects negatively the stronger party, it will 
intend to bypass causing the negotiation’s speed to slow down. 
Second, negotiating this topic usually leads to the installation of a human rights mechanisms of 
verification and prevention which may also have implications for war conducts –especially if peace is 
negotiated while the civil war continues. To the stronger warring party this may be seen as a threat to 
its military power and bargaining capacity (especially if peace is negotiated while the civil war 
continues) which may keep it from reaching an agreement. Conversely, the weaker warring party may 
be adamant in their intention to negotiate other topics precisely because of the potential gains from a 
settlement in this direction. This conflict of interests can lead to a deadlock that may be broken once 
the issue is settled but not bypassed. Additionally, once agreement vis-à-vis human rights is reached 
warring parties may feel more at ease with the process and negotiate further items accordingly. Having 
that said, the hypothesis proposed goes as follows: 
H1: The quicker and agreement on human rights is reached, the quicker peace negotiations will move. 
The operationalization of this variable is fairly simple: it should suffice to look at the ranking of topics 
of the agendas of negotiation of each case. Its discussion, on the other hand, requires an in-depth 
analysis of each negotiation in order to account for the extent to which this issue, in fact, was the first 
one negotiated. Furthermore, the analysis should determine whether it was bypassed or not in case of a 
deadlock, and whether this had an effect in the process’ speed (see below). 
El Salvador and Guatemala’s civil wars are notorious cases in Latin America because of their violence 
and the technics that the warring parties employed in these wars to weaken and annihilate their 
counterparts. Both conflicts were characterized by impunity, disappearances, state-supported death 
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squads and paramilitary, arbitrary detention, tortures, and abductions. It is only natural that any 
agreement reached on human rights includes the parties’ compromise to put a stop to these atrocious 
acts and/or dismantle and neutralize the organizations and institutions responsible for them. 
It can be expected that the contents of an agreement of this kind make parties lock horns or produce 
repeated deadlocks. For one thing, however atrocious these actions are, for warring parties they are 
often useful mechanisms to isolate their enemy and keep it from gaining popular support. It would not 
be in the best interest of the warring party who benefited the most from these actions to agree on 
suppressing the war conducts and mechanisms that have helped them sustain the war in the first place, 
thus leading the negotiations to a deadlock. 
In the same vein, it is often the case that the responsible behind these unacceptable war conducts are 
complex organizations and institutions that derive substantial economic and political benefits from 
them. From their standpoint an agreement on dismantling and sanctioning the responsible for human 
rights violations is untenable, while for those who were victimized by these networks the agreement is 
a must. Furthermore, from the victim’s point of view other agreements may be irrelevant as long as 
there is no compromise in this sense since, say, the possibility to participate in politics is worthless if 
unpunished political assassinations still take place. For these reasons, it can be expected that failure to 
reach an agreement on putting a stop, dismantle or sanction the causes and perpetrators of human 
rights violations will slow down the speed of a peace negotiation. Hence the following hypothesis may 
be formulated: 
 
H2:  If an agreement on putting a stop, dismantle or sanction the causes and perpetrators of human rights violations 
is not reached, peace negotiations will move forward very slowly if at all. 
This variable will be operationalized as follows. An initial analysis of the negotiations will suffice to 
point out when and how topics such as impunity, dismantlement of death squads or corps 
restructuration took place during both peace processes. At later stage, it will be discussed the extent to 
which these topics were indeed related to human rights violations as well as the manner in which they 
affected the speed of the negotiations. Note that although at first glance it seems that hypothesis one 
and two are just alike, they are not. While hypothesis one accounts for human rights as a proper topic 
of discussion, hypothesis two accounts for those actions directed to handling human rights violations 
and violators, and these two are not necessarily included in the same topic of the agenda. For example, 
as the cases here studied show, to not perform extrajudicial killings fell within the framework of 
human rights as a topic of discussion in the agenda, while agreeing to dismantle state-supported 
paramilitary groups –responsible for human rights violations- was part of a different though related 
topic. 
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Lastly, civil wars are characterized for the polarization and the lack of trust they create between 
warring parties. After killing each other for several years, and after employing the most inhuman 
methods for it, warring parties are expected to distrust each other and grant as little as possible during 
negotiations. But warring parties need not to subscribe an agreement to stop or neutralize the causes of 
human rights violations. A warring party’s act of trust building with regard to human rights may bring 
forward peace negotiations because it may be taken as an honest commitment to the process –which in 
turn may be reciprocated in the same fashion, gain the negotiations momentum and bring them 
forward. By contrast, war actions that constitute clear human rights violations may stall negotiation 
processes. From the above reasoning the following hypotheses can be proposed: 
 H3: Acts of trust building or the lack thereof vis-á-vis human rights bring forward negotiations processes. 
Or alternatively:  
H3B: Actions of war that clearly violate human rights slow down or stall negotiations processes.  
In this sense, an act of trust building vis-à-vis human rights will be understood as those actions 
performed voluntarily by one or both parties that directly or indirectly protect human rights, and for 
which the doer had asked formally nothing in return. 
Method of Analysis 
Based on the conceptualization provided by George and Bennett (2005), the research here conducted 
will follow the method of structured, focused comparison for the most part. It will be focused as it will 
only deal with only the variables mentioned assuming that other things remain constant. Of course 
there are many other angles from which the dependent variable can be tackled, but for the purposes of 
this research and with the intention to provide an original piece of investigation, only the three 
mentioned will be examined. Additionally, this research is structured as the general objective of this 
investigation is to propose a new approach to understand the importance that human rights violations 
are given in peace negotiations and, based on the descriptions and discussions provided above, it could 
be argued that the general question reflects that objective and so does the data that is required to 
perform systematic comparison.  
Generally speaking, the resemblances and differences of the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador invite 
one to revisit them in order to draw new lessons. To a certain extent, both peace negotiations revolved 
around demilitarization and new security policies (Kincaid, 2000; Jonas 2000). In both cases the 
warring parties were composed of leftish guerrilla and right-wing (often military) undemocratic 
governments; and, lastly, for both cases their peace agreements meant a democratic transition (Spence, 
2004; Pérez, 2004; Nasi, 2002). However, the timing of the peace negotiations varies to a great extent: 
while in Guatemala it took almost six years to reach a final agreement, for El Salvador it took nearly 
two. The difference in the length of the negotiations invites one to wonder the causes and, specifically, 
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to what extent the element of human rights in their agendas explains this difference. The following 
sections dwell on this. 
More specifically, this paper employs the method of controlled comparison (see Collier 1993). The 
cases selected here will be analyzed and discussed in light of several factors: First, this paper will 
focus almost exclusively on the bargaining rounds
3
 of Guatemala and El Salvador, and their main 
actors. This means that while other historic turning points will be discussed (e.g., the roots of the 
conflict, the roots of the negotiations, or the outcomes of the negotiations), their analyses will be 
marginal. Given that the history and context of both cases are very much alike, it is not expected that 
their omission modifies significantly the findings here reported. In addition, external developments 
such as the integration or intervention of new actors in the rounds will be considered as long as they 
cause variation in the variables studied in this paper. For example, the UN and the United States had a 
more substantial role in the peace process of El Salvador than that of Guatemala. In this case, the 
analysis will account for the extent to which this role had an impact over the variables of interest here
4
.  
Second, this paper will exclusively analyze the relevance of the topic of human rights as 
operationalized above for the speed of the peace negotiations. The rest of the topics included in the 
agenda of negotiation of each case will not be analyzed unless they are key to explain the variation of 
the dependent variable. Lastly, for reasons of both space and budget, the analyses that this paper 
proposes will not dwell on the specific arrangements that made possible surpass deadlocks caused by 
the discussion of human rights. Yet, it is not expected that the absence of caveat in this regard 
undermines the findings of this paper (see below).  
Case Discussion 
Guatemala 
Background. Among some considered the bloodiest civil was in Latin America, the Guatemalan civil 
war lasted for 36 years. It was battled between the Guatemalan State and several rebel groups that later 
on joined forces under the UNRG (Unión Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca).The following 
paragraphs intend to summarize the roots and the context of this civil war. 
As it is discussed in the literature, the roots of the Guatemalan conflict can be found in the political 
and economic exclusion that has characterized the country since the last decade of the XIX century. In 
fact, it was only until 1944 that Guatemala held democratic elections for the first time, considered by 
some the cleanest elections ever held in the country (Nasi 2002; La Feber 1993). The outcome of these 
                                                 
3
 I use the terms bargaining rounds and peace negotiations interchangeably as this is the main focus of the paper.  
4
 The paper will not, however, include an in-depth analysis of the influence of external actors to peace-building. For  analysis far more 
elaborated in this regard see Karl 1992; Stahler-Sholk 1994; Spence and Vickers 1994 
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elections was the attainment of the presidency by Juan José Arévalo who changed several laws and 
passed various reforms with the intention of expanding democracy and ameliorating the economic gap 
between social classes. In line with this reformist spirit, the following president, Jacobo Arbenz 
legalized the Communist party while also proposing a revolutionary agrarian reform with the intention 
to distribute unused lands in the country since by then only 2% of the population owned 72% of the 
arable land (Holiday 1997: 68, Nasi 2002: 404). Naturally the latter attempt faced serious opposition 
and sabotages to the point that The United Fruit Company, the largest land owner in the country at the 
time, lobbied before the US government in order to prevent an alleged “communist take -over 
Guatemala”. Given that the reform and the legalization occurred in midst of the Cold War, the US 
government actively sponsored a coup to overthrow Arbenz from power and collaborated in 
establishing an authoritarian government.  
In addition to the military regime and the political oppression and exclusion that it entails, 
Guatemala’s rebellion can also be explained by its economic exclusion (La Feber 1993; Holiday 1997: 
68; Nasi 2002: 461). After Arbenz’ agrarian reform was aborted, land possession and distribution 
became the cornerstone of the country’s inequality and poverty. In effect, since in the 1960s and 1970s 
Guatemalan economy diversified into cotton and beef production, and since the land that was 
distributed to the poor by the military government was inaccessible jungle, it became practically 
impossible for the poor to break the poverty cycle. To make matters worse, grabbing communal and 
indigenous’ land became a common practice for military officers and powerful politicians (Jonas 2000: 
22). Lastly, since the overthrow of Arbenz until the early 1990s no tax or agrarian reforms were made 
in order to decrease social or economic inequality causing critical falls in purchase power, general 
poverty levels to increase, and ethnic poverty (Jonas 2000: 27). 
It was within this context of socio-economic repression and discrimination that the first guerrilla 
organizations formed in Guatemala in 1960 and 1961. Their creation followed a wave of protests 
against the corrupt presidential elections, and the government of president Ydigoras. The guerrillas 
were created by two army lieutenants, Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima in 1960 and 1961.Sosa formed 
what later became known as the Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre (MR-13), and Lima 
joined the communist party, Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo. However, from the mere beginning of 
the rebellion the state s´ counterinsurgency brutality became patent: Besides the alleged 40 guerrillas 
that were active members of the MR-13, throughout the 1960s 8,000 suspected rebel sympathizers 
were murdered by the Guatemalan army (Nasi 2002: 407). 
According to Nasi (2002:407), while this counter-insurgent campaign led some rebels into exile, it 
also contributed to rebel regrouping in new four organizations that operated in different parts of the 
country, and with different ideologies and strategies. Admittedly, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
(Armed Revolutionary Forces, FAR) were active in the northern part of the country; the Organización 
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Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas (Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms, ORPA) 
settled in the Guatemalan Sierra Madre; the strategy of the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres 
(Guerrilla Army of the Poor, EGP) and the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) was to infiltrate 
unions, students and peasants organizations. Moreover, whereas the EGP and FAR, the military 
stronger groups, actively intended to involve civilians in revolutionary activities, the ORPA only 
engaged in combat with professional guerrilla and actively sought to conceal the identity of its civilian 
supporters (Nasi 2002: 408). 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s these organizations reached their peak and counted with over 
350,000 civilian supporters and over 12,000 armed fighters (Schrimer 1998: 22) (cf. Jonas 2000: 23, 
states that these numbers were in the order of 8000 for armed fighters and 500,000 for supporters).  It is 
also in the early 1980s that the guerrilla united under the umbrella organization URNG. According to 
Nasi (2002: 409) although the rebel groups increased their size, they never managed to get enough 
armament or coordination to overthrow the government. However, precisely because of rapidity with 
which these groups were growing, the Guatemalan army feared that a revolution was possible. As a 
response, under the government of General Romero Lucas (1978-1982), and –especially- Efraín Ríos 
Montt (1982-1983), the army assumed indiscriminate repression against several social organizations 
and decided to conduct a scorched-earth warfare (Victoria 82 and plan Firmeza 83) causing over one 
million of internal displaced persons, burned to death thousands of unarmed men, women and children, 
440 villages were completely wiped off, and over 28,000 civilians were killed or “disappeared” (Ball, 
Kobrak, Spirer 1999: 24; Jonas 2000: 24; Nasi 2002: 410).  
Although initially the brutal repression exercised by the Guatemalan army gained the guerrilla more 
sympathizers, in the long term this strategy paid off for the army because the rebel groups proved 
unable to defend their sympathizers from the army’s retaliation, making many people to change sides  
and stand by the army. Following Stoll (1993, quoted in Nasi 2002: 408), in the end, this situation was 
never beneficial for civilians or the guerrilla because for the most part civilians were simply caught 
between armies and were victims’ of each warring party warfare strategy. Moreover, this strategy 
caused the guerrilla to stop their operations in order to protect their people from this barbarism (Mason 
and Krane, 1989, Nasi 2002: 410, Stoll 1993). 
For some authors, in the short-term the consequences of this strategy materialized in the creation of 
Civilian Patrols or PACS by civilians who ‘voluntarily’ sought for mechanisms of “self-defense” 
against both the guerrilla and the Army (Jonas 2000: 43). Yet, other views hold that the formation of 
PACS in itself was part of the counter-insurgent policy of terror. For one thing, civilians did not join 
PACs voluntarily but were forced to do so in order to not to be killed and serve as vigilantes or spies 
for the army. Secondly, by involving civilians into the armed conflict, the army raised the stakes for 
the rebel groups causing mistrust between them with regard as to how to conduct their military 
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operations or even recruit new members. The creation of PACS is a critical example of how the 
Guatemalan army was consistent with its goals and operations while the URNG remained divided 
ideologically and operationally throughout the conflict. The systematic yet indiscriminate and barbaric 
repression exerted by the Army was a crucial factor to keep guerrilla groups divided (Nasi 2002: 411). 
Among the decisive factors for the rebel groups to be divided was the issue of surrendering or 
continuing the armed struggle after the army’s decision to carry out a scorched-earth policy in the 
early 1980s (Jonas 2000: 35; Nasi 2002: 461). Following Jonas (2000: 24), the scorched-earth tactic 
and the consolidation of military control over the Guatemalan population constituted decisive blows to 
the UNRG and substantially diminished the group’s capacity to take new initiatives until the late 
1980s. Yet, based on the work of Azpuru (1999), it could be argued that the UNRG’s new initiatives 
were for the most part rational responses to the pressure exerted by international and national 
organizations on the rebels and the state to reach peace and political settlements. 
To begin with, in 1985 a new Political Constitution was drafted after the military realized that long 
decades of corruption and repression had finally taken their toll in terms of their legitimacy among the 
Guatemalan people and, most importantly, the International Community –including the US 
government whom had shifted its posture towards the Guatemalan military governments during 
Carter’s administration. Hence, in 1985 democracy returned (at least in its electoral form), elections 
were held again and moderate refomist Vinicio Cerezo, from the Democracia Cristiana (Christian 
Democratic Party) was elected president.  
In addition, in 1986 and 1987, a peace initiative carried on by the governments of Central America, 
called Esquipulas I and II respectively, resulted in the collective signing of the Procedure for 
Establishing a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America, which obliged –to some extent- its 
members to achieve peace with their internal oppositions (Ball, Kobrak, Spirer 1999). In this context, 
in addition to making unofficial contact with the URNG through the hitherto ambassador in Spain, 
Vinicio Cerezo formed the National Commission of Reconciliation which included four military 
officers and was chaired by the Catholic Bishop’s Conference (Jonas 2000: 40; Azpuru 1999: 104). 
Although these talks took place in the midst of political repression and several acts of sabotage, they 
were later seriously considered as a window of opportunity for eventual peace negotiations by the 
URNG (Jonas 2000: 40). Yet, during the talks the army and several large business sectors made 
sufficiently clear that they saw no need for peace negotiations of the kind proposed by the URNG. 
Furthermore, according to Nasi (2002: 417) the URNG itself had little trust in these talks and initially 
entered them only for tactical reasons. 
By the end of 1987, after a couple of failed attempts to start peace talks between the URNG and the 
army, the latter launched what was meant to be their “final offensive”. It was alleged to be final in the 
sense that it aimed at the ultimate destruction of the rebel groups and at consolidating the army’s 
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military victory beyond doubt. However, as much as both government and army claimed that the 
rebels had been defeated by 1990 they saw themselves in the need to acknowledge that war did not 
end (Jonas 2000b: 1). By admitting to this, the conditions to a negotiated end of the conflict flourished 
or, as Zartman (2001) defines it, the conflict was ripe enough to start a peace process. 
Paving the Road to Peace. Right from the start of the negotiations between the State, the army and the 
rebels, the fact that the issue of human rights was the first item in the agenda posed problems to move 
on with the negotiation process. Table 1 summarizes the timing of the Agreements. 
Accord Name Date Content of the Accord 
Querétaro Accord 27-07-1991 Framework Agreement on democratization for peacefully ending the conflict. 
Mexico City Accord 29-03-1994 Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights 
Oslo Accord 23-06-994 Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to clarify past human rights 
violations and acts of violence that have caused Guatemalan population to suffer 
Oslo Accord 31-05-1995 Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed 
Conflict 
Mexico City Accord 31-03-1995 Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Mexico City Accord 6-05-1996 Agreement on Socio-economic Aspects of and Agrarian Situation 
Mexico City Accord 19-09-1996 Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed 
Forces in a Democratic Society  
Oslo Accord 4-12-1996 Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire 
Stockholm Accord 7-12-1996 Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and Electoral Regime 
Madrid Accord 12-12-1996 Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of URNG 
Guatemala City 
Accord 
29-12-1996 Agreement on Implementation, Complying and Verification. 
Guatemala City 
Accord 
29-12-1996 Agreement on Firm and Lasting Peace. 
Average time spent 
per accord 
10,01 
topic/month 
Table 1 Agreements of Guatemala by date and accord. Source: Los acuerdos de paz en Guatemala  
Following Cerezo’s attempts and subsequent failures to start peace talks, the government of Serrano 
opened direct negotiations with the URNG in May 1991, after having agreed on eleven issues to be 
negotiated, and after having systematically distinguished and agreed to negotiating operational issues 
only after the negotiation of substantive issues (Jonas 2000: 69). The first three substantive issues to 
be negotiated addressed the ‘expected’ effects of war such as human rights violation, population 
resettlement, and the need for a Truth Commission. An agreement on these issues was only possible 
during 1994.The other three substantive accords took place between 1995 and 1996, and addressed the 
causes of the conflict (Jonas 2000: 67-69). A priori, it is seems feasible to interpret that the handling 
issues of human rights delayed the process since it was the most time-consuming part. The following 
paragraphs will provide a detail explanation of this situation. 
Guatemala: The Bargaining Rounds 
The first round of peace negotiations intended to discuss democratization and human rights and was 
held on July 22-25, 1991. Despite the initial plan to include both issues in one single accord, the 
agenda was divided and each item discussed separately due to profound disagreements about how to 
address human rights violations. As a result, the first accord signed in the last days July of 1991 dealt 
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exclusively with the establishment of a participatory democracy, the strengthening civil society and 
the promotion of the rule of law (Jonas 2000: 70). 
For its part, the negotiation of human rights was postponed and it took the parts almost three years to 
come to an agreement in this regard. In February 1992 an initial but general pre-agreement was signed 
on the government’s acceptance of its human rights obligations. In August 1992 a partial accord was 
signed on highly a controversial issue such as the future of the PACs: from then on until the end of the 
process, these “civilian self-defense patrols” were to be joined by civilians only if they truly willed to 
do so. For its part, the Human Rights Ombudsman was to verify if this was the case, and both the 
government and the army made the commitment to not form new groups of this kind –unless it was 
strictly necessary and for specific reasons (Jonas 2000: 71). Nonetheless, these commitments were 
only partial accords and were to take effect only when the comprehensive agreement on human rights 
accord was signed. From the situation described above it could be inferred that addressing human 
rights violations (and their causes) held the negotiations back for about seven months. In other words, 
it could also be inferred that the handling of human rights violations and perpetrators is key to explain 
the process’ slow motion. As it will be shown below, a final agreement in this regard helped the 
process move forward. 
There was still a long road ahead of the process before the causes and the perpetrators of human rights 
violations were fully and satisfactorily addressed. For one thing, in August of 1992, the process 
stagnated as parties failed to reach a substantial agreement on implementing a Truth Commission, a 
human rights verification mission, eliminating the PACs, and reducing the size and polit ical power of 
the army. To make matters worse, by only offering a watered-down version of this proposals for 
human rights and demilitarization in exchange for an immediate cease-fire, president Serrano gave 
clear signs of not being willing to negotiate more substantive issues (Jonas 2000: 41). For Serrano, the 
Guatemalan Right, and a large part of the army, agreeing to such measures for safeguarding human 
rights simply meant to give the country away to the rebels. 
In May 1993 Serrano intended to close down Congress and suspend all Constitutional mechanisms of 
political control in order to overcome prospects of impeachment and corruption charges. The self-coup 
was not successful at all because Serrano was forced to step down soon after. Not only a broad civil 
coalition comprised by the business sector, political parties, social organizations, universities (called 
Foro Multisectorial) sought to immediately restore the constitutional order, but had he insisted on 
remaining in office Guatemala would have faced the threats from various countries to impose 
sanctions against it (Nasi 2002: 420). Yet, the self-coup and its aftermath took its toll on the peace 
negotiations and drove them into a continuous deadlock. The political and institutional turbulence 
caused by Serrano lost the parties’ trust in the process and made them unwilling to negotiate any 
further. 
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Note that although the negotiations had officially started in April 1991 under Jorge Serrano’s tenure, 
by 1993 no substantive agreement on the matter had been reached. Without having made any progress 
in the negotiations or at least breaking their deadlock, Serrano was forced to step down after his failed 
auto-golpe (self-coup). Congress then appointed Ramiro de León Carpio (the government’s former 
Ombudsman for Human Rights) the same year who, under a new set of rules and different basis for the 
negotiations placed the issues of human rights on the government’s political agenda and managed to 
push forward the negotiations (Ball, Kobrak, Spirer 1999: 31; Jonas 2000: 43).  
In order to overcome the negotiation’s stagnation it became necessary to sign a new Framework 
Accord (Acuerdo Marco) in January 1994. In this new Framework, the URNG managed to secure and 
reaffirm what had been settled in agreements already signed as well as to make substantial changes in 
mechanisms of the negotiations. To begin with, the composition of the bargaining table changed with 
the upgrade of the UN from observer to moderator. Secondly, the role of Mexico, Spain, the United 
States, Norway, Venezuela and Colombia was formalized in order to formally support the peace 
process. Lastly, a number of different social sectors grouped in the Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil 
(Civil Society Assembly) joined the bargaining table with the purpose of submitting their (non-binding) 
own proposals (Jonas 2000: 42,70). While the negotiations were set in motion thanks to the pressure 
and guarantees offered by these actors, it should be noted that a consequence of the framework 
agreement for the negotiations was the establishment of a “timetable” that kept a comprehensive 
agreement on human rights as the first item in the agenda. Once again, the negotiations’ speed 
depended on addressing this issue first.  
Only until March 1994 an agreement (the Comprehensive Accord on Human Rights) that formally 
addressed the causes and perpetrators of human rights violations was signed. This accord included 
compromises from both parties to respect human rights as established in the Constitution and the 
agreements to which the country was part of; and both parties agreed to respect humanitarian 
international law regarding war. For its part, the government agreed to eliminate all secret security 
units and purge the official existing ones; guarantee that PACs will not violate human rights; and to 
guarantee freedom of association movement, and organization. However, due to profound differences 
between the parties the possibility of instituting a Truth Commission for Guatemala was left to be 
negotiated separately in order to avoid another deadlock at this point (Holiday 1997: 72; Jonas 2000: 
71). As it was suggested before, the possibility of coming to an agreement of this kind gained the 
process speed and helped to bring the parties close enough to move on with the agenda of negotiation. 
In June 1994, the agreement on Resettlement of Population groups Uprooted by Armed Conflict was 
signed in Oslo. The same month the parties finally reached the accord to set Guatemala’s Truth 
Commission (Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence That Have 
Cause the Guatemalan Population to Suffer - CEH). Despite the timing in which the agreements and 
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accords took place, and the fact that they were practically signed back to back previous disagreements 
about how to handle human rights violations and perpetrators were far from overcome. In addition to a 
deadlock that lasted for about three weeks in June, the outstanding stagnation that followed these 
agreements supports this assertion.  
According to Jonas (2000: 45-65), negotiations first deadlocked before reaching an agreement on the 
CEH because the URNG proposed a Truth Commission with the characteristics of that of ONUSAL 
(see section El Salvador) while the establishment’s side was determined to not to agree to any 
commission of the sort. From a rational perspective and considering the State’s share on killings and 
disappearances (see below), it was only logical that a commission authorized to name names that 
could lead to, at least, some kind of social sanction was out of the question for the army and the 
government. The above-mentioned group of countries involved officially in the process stepped in to 
exert the necessary pressure to surpass stagnation and convinced both parties to agree to a commission 
whose purpose was only to shed light (esclarecer) past human rights violations without naming names 
(Holiday: 1997: 71).  
Then the negotiations completely stalled after this agreement. For one thing, the accord on the CEH 
also produced a major crisis on the process because the government had failed to comply with its 
shares of the accord. A possible explanation for this may be found in the reverberations that the 
agreement produced: whereas within the Guatemalan right the CEH as such was considered as a 
reason valid enough to attempt a coup (Jonas 2000: 64), on the side of the social movements the 
agreement was seen as simply unacceptable. Hence, the government may have decided not to comply 
with the agreement in order to not to ruffle the Right even more and risk a coup while taking 
advantage of the lack of pressure from the social organizations who saw the agreement as simply 
unacceptable. Be it as it may, this deadlock was to be expected: as mentioned above, the actor that 
could have been carried the main burden from a commission in charge of digging in the past and 
establishing the truth about the more than 30 massacres and the genocide was the army. Also, it has 
been held elsewhere (see Berdal & Keen 1997; Keen 1998) that although massacres, displacement and 
genocide often portrayed political motives, there too were economic benefits derived from these 
horrendous actions. Not surprisingly, findings in this direction would have compromised more than 
just the army. 
The government’s failure to comply with its share of the agreements was only one of the causes for the 
deadlock. Although the UN Verification Mission –MINUGUA- was supposed to begin functioning 
immediately, it only made presence in late October, a terrible timing for being late provided that 
during these months human rights violations raised dramatically and war intensified (the number of 
killings and disappearances sparked from about 100 in 1993 to almost 300 in 1994 (Ball, Kobrak, 
Spirer 1999:32). Given the lack of will from the government’s side to comply with what was a lready 
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agreed upon, and the MINUGUA’s failure to begin activities on the spot, the URNG refused to 
continue with any kind of negotiations until the Mission’s deployment and the accords compliance 
from the government’s side were facts.  
In late October 1994, international intervention and the deployment of MINUGUA contributed to 
break the deadlock and resume negotiations. Following Jonas (2000: 47), this could be attributed for 
the most part to the mission: the presence of MINUGUA changed Guatemala’s human rights context 
because it stood as symbol that the international community was watching closely the parties’ 
commitment to the agreements. In turn, its presence provided Guatemalans a space where they could 
exercise and overcome their fears to freely express, associate and organize. 
Despite MINUGUA’s deployment and resumption of the negotiations, the aforementioned crisis 
caused to the parties to lose credibility in the entire peace process and negotiations moved on slowly. 
Only until March 1995 that the next agreement, the Accord on Identity and Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, was reached.  
As it was illustrated above, the number of agreements signed in a given period of time is not a good 
indication of the speed with which the process is being conducted. For example, if any conclusions 
were to be drawn from the number of agreements signed between 1995 and 1996, it could be falsely 
concluded that the process was not moving forward. But, in fact, there seemed to have been no 
relevant deadlocks. Instead, according to Jonas (2000: 46) a plausible explanation as to why there were 
no agreements signed between March 1995 and May 1996 could be that negotiations took second 
place to the November elections.  
The Agreement on Implementation, Complying and Verification took place in Guatemala on the 29
th
 
of December in 1996. As it has happened in most post-conflict societies, the implementation of the 
Accords constituted a whole different enterprise in which human rights violations also have played a 
significant role (see Nasi 2002). 
Did Human Rights Affect the Speed of the Rounds? 
A plausible interpretation as to why negotiations gained speed after Carpio’s changes may be that it 
showed willingness to indeed negotiate the topic of human rights. After all, the reluctance of the 
URNG to move on and discuss other issues until an agreement on human rights was reached, and the 
negligence of the army and the government to start the negotiations with this issue could only be 
explained by the significance of the topic to both parties and the implications to their bargaining 
powers. Discussing this topic first was of most importance to the URNG because from the outcome of 
this negotiation the rebels could foresee the extent to which the government was willing to 
compromise and comply with the negotiations as a whole. The URNG was well aware that human 
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rights was a delicate subject for the interests of the army and the government as they were held 
responsible for 93% of the cases of political assassinations, massacres, disappearances, and 
extrajudicial killings (See Table 2). In addition, it would have given the rebels reason to believe that if, 
say, there was compromise to stop political assassinations, future agreements on less conflictive topics 
would be respected as well.  
Type of Human Rights Violation Number of Human Rights Violations 
Killings 34,146 
Kidnapping and Illegal Detention 3,506 
Disappearance 2,760 
Torture 1,279 
Injury 1,083 
Total 42,774 
Table 2. Total Human Rights Violations 1959-1995. Source: Ball, Kobrak, Spirer, 1999. 
On the other hand, discussing human rights for the stronger warring party, the Guatemalan state/army, 
implied also discussing most of the army’s and state apparatus existence. To begin with, to dismantle 
the PACS entailed giving away the army’s civilian surveillance network. Following Popkin (1996, 
quoted in Nasi 2002: 550), it could be argued that the PACS were one the most notorious mechanisms 
of vigilance and recruitment that the army had to carry out its repressive policy provided that its main 
goal was to efficiently intimidate and reprimand civilians so that they would think about it twice 
before collaborating with the rebels. Additionally, an agreement on human rights conditioned the army 
and prevented it from repressing social organizations or unarmed civilians which, as it was discussed 
above, was a key tactic used by the army in order to keep the rebel groups from conducting operations 
against the establishment. In the same vein, convening to respect and promote human rights would 
make unjustifiable to keep large, multifunctional, budget-consuming corps –not to mention how 
menacing this would be in the eyes of the soon-to-be demobilized guerrillas. Needless to say, such an 
institutional and organizational cut entailed a direct attack to the best interest of many army officers, 
particularly to hardliner members. In fact, there were two failed attempts to topple Cerezo’s 
government by some military hardliners who feared a change in the status-quo after Esquipulas II 
(Nasi 2002: 436). 
Additionally, according to Ball, Kobrak, Spirer (1999: 60), unlike other cases in Latin America, the 
Guatemalan state was notoriously characterized for its practices of outright murder and disappearance. 
Political imprisonment in Guatemala was a rather rare practice; instead political assassinations was the 
common factor. In fact, it is estimated that twenty-nine percent of the total of killings were isolated 
assassinations (Ball, Kobrak, Spirer 1999:59). With this in mind, it becomes clear that for the weaker 
warring party in this context, the URNG, reaching an agreement on human rights compliance and 
protection was the cornerstone of any negotiation. It would have made no sense for the URNG to have 
proposed any other issue to be discussed first and foremost -or to have agreed on disarming before 
negotiating for that matter. For one thing, the safety of their rebels and their relatives would be far 
20 
 
from guaranteed in a context in which the State is especially designed to perform counter-insurgence 
operations that clearly bypass human rights or international treaties, and in which selective political 
murder is the norm. In addition, had the Guatemalan state had no restriction to perform political 
repression and assassinations, it could have used these practices to intimidate and mitigate the 
URNG’s members and their political demands thus diminishing their negotiation power at the 
bargaining table. 
It should be clear by now why discussing human rights before any other topic was a major concern for 
the warring parties. First, an agreement of this kind had substantial consequences for the raison d'être 
of both parties because it entailed changes in the way they conducted war and claimed society’s 
support. Second, an agreement on this matter also provoked changes in their power of negotiation and, 
possibly, their bargaining chips for further topics –e.g., conditioning the dismantlement of PACS on a 
URNG’s maximalist agenda modification. In short, the arguments above presented should have laid 
the basis for understanding why and how negotiating human rights as the first topic in the agenda 
caused changes in the speed of the Guatemalan’s peace process. 
As it has been proposed before, addressing the causes of human rights violation is expected to affect 
the pace of the negotiations. In this instance, the government’s negligence and the poor timing of 
MINUGUA meant to the URNG that no action was going to be taken with regard human rights 
violations, providing them with no incentive to carry on with the process. At this point, it could be 
argued that the way human rights violations were handled had an impact in the speed of the 
negotiation process of Guatemala: poor complying with the agreements to handle and prevent human 
rights violations stalled the process.  
In the case of Guatemala, an agreement to neutralize, dismantle and prevent causes of human rights 
violations was a touchy subject that had direct implications to the speed of the process. Initially, the 
signing of the Comprehensive Accord on Human Rights seemed to have jumpstarted the process since, 
for the most part, the items embedded in it aimed at neutralizing, dismantling and preventing human 
rights violations. This could have fostered trust between the parties and motivated them to move 
forward with the agenda. Later, discrepancies on a key element, a Truth Commission, meant a full stop 
to the negotiations. As it was discussed above, however watered-down, the truth commission in itself 
represented a threat to various sectors that managed to block its implementation and stall the 
negotiations.  
The priority of human rights as a topic of discussion, and the actual agreement on neutralizing, 
dismantling and preventing violations indeed account to some extent for the speed of the process. It 
should now be evaluated whether the pace of these peace negotiations can be explained by the 
variables proposed in third hypothesis. As it will be discussed below, acts of trust-building (or their 
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opposite) vis-à-vis human rights violations also had a considerable impact on the speed of these21 
peace negotiations. 
These elections held in November 1995 had significant consequences for the process’ speed. The fact 
that for the first time in decades of political repression the Left was allowed to participate in elections 
and gain six seats in Congress fostered trust in both the process and between the other parties. 
Admittedly, the guaranteeing freedom of association and organization paid off: these impressive and 
positive results led the URNG to drop their maximalist agenda and accelerate the process (Holiday 
1997: 73). Furthermore, after being elected president, Álvaro Arzú, gave clear indication of his 
support to the peace process by purging the military and the police, and appointed a former URNG 
militant as head of the new Commission for Peace (COPAZ) (Whitfield 1999: 276). These actions 
were taken as a token of good will by the URNG who suspended military actions in March of 1996. In 
return, the government suspended counterinsurgency operations (Nasi 2000: 426). 
In September 1996 the Accord on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and Role of the Armed Forces 
in a Democratic Society was signed by the warring parties. As difficult as it was to negotiate matters 
concerning a reduction of the GDP share that went into the army, the size of the army itself and its 
new political limitations, it could be argued that it should be no surprise that in this phase of the 
negotiations there were no major impasses. After all, trust-building actions such as having held clean 
and fair presidential and congress elections (Jonas 2000: 49); a halt to military operations by the army 
and the rebels, the secret face-to-face meetings between military officers and rebel commanders (Nasi 
2000: 428); and the substantial decrease on the number of killings and disappearances (by 1996 the 
frequency of these acts was the lowest since 1960 (cf. Ball, Kobrak, Spirer 1999:12-32)) gained the 
parties and the process itself enough momentum to discuss this type of issues without making the 
negotiations more difficult than what they already needed to be. 
Nonetheless, as it has been suggested above, even isolated acts that constitute human rights violations 
can slow down peace negotiations’ pace. This was the case when in August 1996 a woman from the 
Guatemalan social elite was kidnapped by members of the rebel group ORPA, causing an immediate 
suspension of negotiations for several weeks as well as the suspension of the dismantling of the PACs 
(an item which was finally agreed upon in the Accords of September 1996). Following Nasi (2000: 
434), it may be argued that the only reason it was possible to resume the negotiations was because 
they had gained speed or, as a Guatemalan military officer put it, the speed of the process was as that 
of “[a car that] went down the hill without breaks” (interview, Guatemala city 1998, in Nasi 2002: 
434). 
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El Salvador 
Background. The roots of El Salvador’s civil war are, to some extent, alike those of Guatemala. To 
begin with, since its independence from Spain in 1839, El Salvador had arranged land tenure issues in 
a manner that usually benefited the plantation oligarchy. Initially, the land tenure system was designed 
so that non-elites and landless individuals would have to see for themselves where in the country they 
could be absorbed communal lands (ejidos), thus placing this land pressure on internal migration 
instead of on the large landowners (Mason and Krane 1989: 186). With the shift to coffee production, 
the ejidos became the most suitable lands for coffee cultivation which directed the plantation 
oligarchy’s interests to these and to the official abolition of communal ownership in order to own them, 
causing the displacement of thousands of peasants that lived and worked there. Despite the social 
turmoil that these reforms caused, no agrarian reforms were considered then or after: following the 
changes in the international market after the World-War II, there was shift on land use that increased 
even more the value of land that was not suitable for cultivating coffee but usable for cattle or cotton 
(Durhman 1979, as quoted in Mason and Krane 1989: 186). As a result of the land-grabbing and 
expropriations phenomena, by “1975, two per cent of the population owned almost two-thirds of the 
land in El Salvador, while for the 40 percent that was landless wages represented only half of the 
familiar income” (Mason and Krane 1989: 186). 
Although the military rule of El Salvador started after the coup in December 1931, the previous 
regimes were not much more democratic or less repressive than the governments that followed 
General Hernández Martinez tenure. According to Williams and Walter (1997: 14-20), in addition to 
no government being peacefully replaced by another, the years prior to the military regime were also 
characterized by political violence, presidential nepotism and despotism, shock troops or military 
control and surveillance, particularly in the coffee-growing areas in the countryside. Despite such 
legacy and three more decades of military rule, it was during the 1970s that the frustration with the 
regime’s political exclusion, fraud and political repression that many people joined armed insurgencies 
(Nasi 2002: 337). In addition, it was during this decade that the Salvadorian state repression against 
supporters of the opposition became patent. As reported by Mason and Krane (1989: 188), between 
1972 and 1980, the Guardia Nacional wounded or killed in broad daylight thousands of participants 
during several peaceful demonstrations against the government’s expenditures, electoral fraud and 
political repression.  
As a result, in 1980 the umbrella organizations Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) 
and the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), were formed in order to group the five rebel 
organizations that were created during the 1970s with the intention of toppling the government and 
forcing a revolution (Karl 1992: 149). Contrary to their Guatemalan counterpart, it could be argued 
that the military operations conducted, the strength, and decisiveness to win the war by military means 
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exhibited by the FMLN during the war are fair indicators of their inner coherence. By contrast, in this 
case it was the army the warring party that showed signs of internal disputes and power struggles (see 
Paige 1997; Williams and Walter 1997).  
As it was illustrated above, although throughout the 1970s political violence, kidnapping, and 
assassinations became more and more common, it could be argued that the Salvadorian civil war 
started in 1981, after the FMLN launched the “final offensive”, a full-scale guerrilla operation that 
attempted to topple the government of the Junta and trigger revolution. Following Nasi (2002: 341) the 
offensive failed to either overthrow the Junta or trigger the revolution, but served to show the extent of 
the military might of the FMLN as well as marked the starting point of aggressive military operations 
from both parties, and the timid, tactical but joined idea of a negotiated end to the conflict. 
The following twelve years of civil war accounted for the deaths of between 75,000 and 100,000 
people in El Salvador. The estimates depend on the source on which one relies. For example, as 
reported by Socorro Jurídico Cristiano (quoted in Nasi 2002: 59), from 1977 and 1985 46,871 
civilians were killed by the military or dead squads. Nonetheless, according the Archbishop-run 
human rights organization Tutela Legal, 26,250 people were killed in the period 1982-1990 (quoted in 
McClintock 1998: 117). In either case, sources agree that the Salvadorian state was the responsible for 
between 62% and 74%. This percentages make sense given that the state’s repression and violence 
was present throughout the 1980s and was particularly exercised by its 50 year-old paramilitary 
structure. For instance, the death squads were selectively assassinating five to ten opposition 
supporters a day (Wheaton as quoted by Mason and Krane 1989: 188). 
Paving the Road to Peace. During the civil war, particularly during the tenure of Jorge Napoleón 
Duarte (1984-1989), the Salvadorian state offered three times to the FMLN to finish the conflict 
through negotiated means by offering an amnesty, and possibilities for political incorporation to the 
hitherto political system in exchange of the rebels’ disarm and surrender (Karl 1992: 150). In hindsight 
it may seem obvious why the war never ended under these conditions but, in order to further 
understand the relevance of human rights and human rights violations for the peace process, it may be 
worth pointing out some of the reasons that explain why the FMLN turned down the governments’ 
proposal time and again and insisted in discussing the end of the war in broader terms.  
To begin with and as it was demonstrated by the ofensiva final, despite the rigorous control of civilians 
by the army, the paramilitary, and by the security forces, the FMLN was at least just as strong 
militarily and logistically as the Salvadorian army. Hence there was no reason to surrender because of 
the fear of a military defeat. The fact that right after the ofensiva the US government technical and 
financial aid to the Salvadorian army increased substantially supports this assertion (Williams and 
Walter 1997: 142). Secondly, the political system to which FMLN would have been able to enter if 
they had surrendered was one in which no Left groups or political parties were allowed to truly 
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democratically participate (Paige 1997: 204). Furthermore, the eventual amnesty offered by the 
government under the hitherto system provided no guarantees for the lives of the members of the 
FMLN or their relatives (Paige 1997: 202). Support to this reasoning may be found in the number of 
human rights violations, disappearances and selective killings attributed to the Army and its 
paramilitary forces during this decade
5
. Lastly, any peaceful settlement that did not include substantial 
changes in the state’s policies towards the punishment of human rights violators was as good as simply 
surrendering in exchange of nothing. As it will be discussed below in greater detail, it was only with a 
written commitment in that regard and before a binding institution such as the UN, that the FMLN 
believed that the Salvadorian state would actively respect human rights and prosecute their violators 
without impunity (Paige 1997: 204-212).  
As to the international factors that account for the war’s continuation, it must be mentioned that the 
US governments had an influential role for both initiatives: In principle, under Reagan’s 
administration the idea of a negotiated end to the conflict became a distant possibility. The US 
government saved no efforts in providing the necessary technical training and equipment to the 
Salvadorian army to help them achieve a military victory. At the same time, Reagan’s administration  
also provided assistance to the design of the 1983 new political constitution and the 1984 first order 
elections, that were meant to corner the FMLN politically and put in evidence an alleged negligence to 
end the war once constitutional changes occurred (Karl 1992: 149). However, under Bush’s tenure the 
narratives had changed. The US financial and technical help to the Salvadorian army was cut and 
conditioned on the improvement of their human rights record and the progress made at the peace 
bargaining table (Williams and Walter 1997: 145).  
By 1987 the FMLN had already recognized that it was highly unlikely for either side to achieve a 
military victory and had even started conversations with politicians from other countries in order to 
gain international endorsement for eventual peace talks. This did not mean, however, that in the late 
1980s, the FMLN or the army were actively giving signs that a bargained solution to the conflict was a 
foreseeable possibility. For one thing, condemnable war conducts remained: by 1987 the FMLN was 
still practicing the forcible recruitment of minors; in 1987 the army conducted another mass execution 
(known as the massacre of San Vicente); the death squads were responsible for 96 murders, the FMLN 
killed eight mayors for allegedly collaborating with the arm;, and 150 people were killed by 
landmines
6
. Table 3 summarizes the records of human rights violations for the second half of 1980s. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1993 
6
 Comisión de la Verdad, 1993 
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Type of Human Rights Violation Year Number of Cases Reported 
Political Assassinations 1986 59 
1987 34 
1988 66 
1989 43 
Disappearances 1986 96 
1987 118 
1988 123 
1989 218 
Table 3. El Salvador’s record of human rights violations 1986-1987Source: McClintock 1998: 113-118 
 
In June 1989, moderate conservative Alfredo Cristiani, became president of El Salvador. Cristiani’s 
administration represented a turning point for peace prospects in the country. Following Bland (1989: 
27, quoted in Nasi 2002: 351), Cristiani made it clear from the start that one of the main goals of his 
tenure was to find a negotiated solution to end the civil war. He invited the FMLN to have private 
talks in order to work on a proposal suitable for both sides with the condition that in the process no 
party left the bargaining table. Furthermore, after only three weeks upon taking office Cristiani formed 
the first peace commission in charge of crafting the abovementioned proposals alongside the FMLN. 
To this end, the rebel groups and the commission met initially in September 1989 in Mexico and Costa 
Rica.  
However, this should not be taken to mean that the road to peace negotiations was clear. For one thing, 
no clear agreement on the proposals came out of these meetings as such. Secondly, soon after the 
second meeting finished, the headquarters of the National Federation of the Union of Salvadoran 
Workers (FENASTRAS) was bombed by the right, killing ten people. The FMLN broke the talks off 
and stated that it was willing to resume them only when repression stopped (Munk 1993: 80). The 
FMLN, however, launched it largest military offensive on 11 November 1989. This offensive, called 
hasta el tope, only exacerbated the army’s reaction who responded five days later with the  killing of 
six Jesuit priests and two women
7
. Paradoxically, these actions did not lead to a continuation of the 
conflict or larger military operations; instead, in addition to drawing the international community’s 
attention who forced both sides to a bargained end, such offensives made both sides realize that their 
counterpart had the military might to carry on and not surrender, that is, a military stalemate (see Karl 
1992, Munck 1993; Nasi 2002).  
If one accepts the military stalemate as one of the causes for the parties to start actual peace 
negotiations, then it could also be proposed that a further consequence of this stalemate was the fact 
that in the agenda of negotiation human rights and the military were set as the first two topics to be 
addressed. The strength of the FMLN came from its military power (not popular support as seen by the 
failed revolutions that both ofensivas were supposed to trigger) which was precisely what the 
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 Comisión de la Verdad, 1993. 
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Salvadorian state had required them to give away in previous occasions as a condition to start a peace 
process. However, without weapons and no verifiable compromise of the State with regard to human 
rights, the FMLN would be at the mercy of the army provided that human right violations was the 
norm and hardly any military officer or politician was ever held accountable for them. Hence, for the 
FMLN, in order to maintain the correlation of forces exhibited by the military stalemate throughout 
the peace negotiations the army’s military capability needed to be properly restrained in a legal 
binding framework such as the one provided in the human rights agreement.  
El Salvador: Bargaining Rounds 
After the rounds of Geneva (April 1990) and Caracas (May 1990), both sides agreed on first 
addressing in sequence the following seven substantive political issues: military, human rights, the 
judicial system, elections, constitutional reform, social and economic problems, and UN verification of 
the peace process.. Once there was agreement on these topics a ceasefire and FMLN reincorporation 
into civil and political life was to be negotiated
8
 (Munk 1993: 81). Table 4 summarizes the dates and 
the agreements signed. 
Accord Name Signature Content of the Accord 
Geneva Accord 4-04-1990 
Framework Agreement for the Political Settlement to Finish the Civil War. 
Expand Democracy and Unrestricted Guarantees of Respect for Human Rights. 
San José Accord 
21-05-1990/ 26 -
07- 1990 
Partial Agreement on Human Rights 
Mexico Accord 27-04-1991 Constitutional Reforms and Truth Commission 
Nueva York 
Accord 
25 -09-1991 
Social and Economic Changes. Conformation of CONPAZ and size and functions 
of the Military 
Nueva York Act 31-12-1991 Army’s final functions and size. Scope of the Ad-hoc commission 
Chapultepec 
Agreement 
16 -01-1992 
Final Peace Agreement. 
Average time per 
accord 
2,8 topic/month 
Table 4. Summary of the agreements signed in El Salvador. Source: Acuerdo de paz de El Salvador. 
As it can be expected, the first two topics were not easily going to be discussed and agreed upon since 
they aimed at the foundations of the army’s political and military power. The issue over a military 
reform drove the negotiations to a deadlock from June 1990 to April 1991. Although the topics in the 
agenda were to be negotiated in strict order, in his role of UN facilitator Álvaro de Soto sustained the 
negotiations by convincing the sides to sign a partial accord on human rights that was “literally pulled 
out of the hat”9. This agreement established a number of basic human rights that the parties were to 
respect as well as comply with an immediate end to night arrests, detentions without a warrant and 
torture (ONUSAL, Karl 1992: 156; Whitfield 1999: 265). Furthermore, it is widely held that both 
                                                 
8
 While some sources hold that the FMLN was willing to agree to a ceasefire as soon as the whole agenda was discussed and negot iated 
upon (see Munk 1998; Nasi 2002), others hold that the ceasefire was conditioned to the army’s reformation (see Martínez Peñate 2011 ).  
9
 The expression, regularly seen in the literature to describe the manner in which de Soto brought the proposal to the bargaining table, most 
probably refers to the secrecy and tactfulness with which the proposal was funded, crafted and issued. According to Martínez Penate (2011), 
Sweden provided the funding to hire a commission of experts in human rights whose task was to systematize proposals in this regard. The 
final proposal was presented to the parts who agreed to it without making any substantial changes. Finally, UN expert Pedro Nikken worded 
the final accord signed by the parties.  
27 
 
parties proposed to the UN to deploy a human rights verification mission before agreeing to ceasefire 
–although the later was only to be discussed after all topics in the agenda were negotiated (cf. 
Martínez Penate 2011). ONUSAL was required to serve as an observatory of human rights in the 
country, support judicial authorities, and formulate recommendations to the parties (Dogget & Kircher 
2005: 7).  
While this partial accord was insufficient to produce a major breakthrough or break the deadlock for 
having left the most critical issue for the parties unresolved, it could be argued that it was precisely the 
content of the partial agreement on human rights –despite its depth- what brought the negotiations 
forward, although poorly. In other words, it could also be argued that the process maintained its initial 
speed with the agreement of Geneva in which human rights and the military were placed as the first 
issues. The agreement also kept the negotiations from collapsing due to the measures that were taken 
in order to only address future human rights violations. Yet it was precisely because no agreement was 
reached on how to neutralize and sanction those responsible for human rights violations or prevent 
further impunity in this regard that no further progress was made. Lastly, as Nasi reports (2002: 354), 
for the FMLN commanders signing this accord and having it implemented immediately made the 
rebels trust the process and continue with it because the accord decreased their fears of being at risk 
once they demobilized. 
A major breakthrough occurred throughout April 1991, in Mexico, when the sides finally started to 
make concessions on the military. Aware of the critical delay on the agreements, sides accorded to 
hold a marathon series of negotiations during this month. The speed with which they agreed on the 
issues discussed was crucial: as established in the Salvadorian Constitution, any reform to the 
Constitution itself must be approved by two consecutive Assembly legislatures, and the hitherto 
Assembly’s term was to be finished in April of 1991. For this reason, any agreement that implied a 
Constitutional change –such as the role, size and capacities of the army- must have been reached by 
then or else it should have had to wait at least 6 more years to have any effect (Martínez Peñate 2011). 
Conscious of the importance of timing, the army and the Salvadorian right in the Assembly sought to 
not reach any agreement at all in April, which was condemned by the international community. 
Pressure from the UN, the European Community, president Bush, the US government and the Central 
American presidents forced celerity in the negotiations and the voting in favor of the reforms (Karl 
1992: 157). 
Then, in April 27 1991, parties signed the Accords of Mexico. The accords restricted the power of the 
army and reduced its competence to solely defend the country‎’s international borders; created a 
national police force under civilian control; and limited the jurisdiction of military courts (Karl 1992: 
159). Furthermore, there was also an agreement to create a “Truth Comission” that, unlike that of 
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Guatemala, would name names of the responsible for gross human rights violations committed from 
1981 until the end of the war (Dogget & Kircher 2005: 18). 
The fact that at this point there was no final consensus on two more fundamental issues such as the 
purge of the officer corps and the timing for a cease-fire deadlocked the negotiations again for five 
months. As Nasi (2002: 374) points out, this was a classic Catch-22 situation because for the FMLN a 
cease-fire was only possible if a final agreement on military reforms was reached. For its part, the 
army objected to commence any reforms on the corps until there was a ceasefire. At last, this new 
impasse was momentarily surpassed with the agreement of New York in September 1991. This accord 
stipulated in general terms the creation of an ad-hoc commission to “purify the armed forces” (Dogget 
& Kircher, 2005: 11). In addition to the commission, the agreement included a reduction of the size 
and professionalization of the army, a creation of the National Police under the civilian control, and a 
new National Commision for the Consolidation of Peace (Martínez Peñate 2011). 
Precisely because of the lack of agreement on the depth of the eventual dissolution of the army, and 
the specific attributes of the Ad-hoc commission and the new National Police created by 
aforementioned the New York Agreement, the negotiations stalled for the last time before the final 
accord signed on December 31 1991. After heavy international mediation and pressure, the parts 
finally agreed to a reduction of 2/3 of the hitherto size of the Salvadorian army (Benitez 1992: 91, 
quoted in Nasi 2002: 374), as well as to a Truth Commission in charge of investigating the human 
rights record of officers of the army, and issue recommendations for their discharge or transfer. Once 
the agreement was signed and reached, the parties signed the Chapultepec Agreements, on January 16 
1992. This agreement compelled all previous agreements and final versions of the peace accords.  
What Was the Impact of Human Rights for the Speed of El Salvador’s 
Negotiations? 
It is contended here that a quick agreement on human rights and an agreement on neutralizing and 
sanctioning the causes and perpetrators of human rights violations are factors that help to explain the 
speed of peace negotiations. The following paragraphs provide an analysis of these relationships. In a 
separate section the relevance of acts of trust building vis-à-vis human rights for the speed of the 
Salvadorian peace process will be discussed as the analysis of this dynamic requires a different 
narrative.  
Different from the counterinsurgent state of Guatemala in which some political institutions and 
bureaucracies were, to some extent, under civilian control, the Salvadorian state was ‘colonized’ by 
the army, that is, virtually every political institution, social sector, and aspect of everyday life was 
militarized (see Williams and Walter 1997). This situation helps to explain why despite all the 
international pressure and threats to withhold economic aid to the country , El Salvador’s record of 
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human rights violations and impunity levels did not improve before the end of the war: those 
responsible for atrocious human rights violations were granted amnesties by a militarized judicial 
branch time and again, and continued to hold office within the government and its dependencies. With 
this in mind, it seems only logical that the FMLN declined Duarte’s proposal of disarming and 
accepting an amnesty in order to enter the hitherto political system in exchange of surrendering: 
besides contradicting the rebel’s ideological and political commitment, accepting this proposal would 
have constituted signing a dead sentence of the sort.  
Most importantly, this situation also helps to understand why for the FMLN the first topic to be 
negotiated was human rights, why it was deeply connected to the abolition or restructuration of the 
army, and why failure to reach an agreement in this direction stalled the process. For one thing, the 
Corps was responsible for over 70% of the political assassinations and disappearances among other 
atrocious human rights violations
10
. As long as there was no agreement to substantially limit their 
power and effectively sanction their actions, the rebels had no realistic reason to believe that they 
would not be intimidated or even annihilated despite the ongoing peace negotiations. In consequence, 
due to the lack of agreement over these issues the process stalled for almost a year, though a few 
sporadic pre-agreements allowed it move on and not collapse. 
Second, while negotiating a purge and a reform of the armed forces were necessary to properly 
neutralize and prevent future human rights violations from the beginning of the negotiations, these 
measures contradicted the army’s best political and economic interests, which helps to explain why 
this party delayed and sabotaged the negotiations over these topics until the very end of the process. 
Put differently, given the extent to which the military had colonized the state any changes in this 
direction represented a direct threat to the Corps’ economic and political sources of power. Without 
these the army would have limited its bargaining power from the start. In consequence, this party 
avoided the negotiation of the topic causing the process speed to slow down, even to stall. 
Thirdly, it would be safe to assume that the mere possibility of being imprisoned or sanctioned for 
crimes against humanity or human rights violations is not in the best interest of those responsible for 
them. For this reason, it was expected that a proposal to ultimately neutralize and sanction the causes 
and perpetrators of human rights violations would not be easily accepted by the army and the 
government, especially if their large share of responsibilities in gross human rights violations is 
considered. The fact that this particular aspect of the negotiations strewn a gridlock all over the peace 
process seems to support this reasoning. 
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 This estimate varies though not greatly depending on the source cf. McClintock 1998 
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In conclusion, the findings discussed above seem to provide evidence to support hypotheses one and 
two. The following section discusses how and why hypothesis three cannot be sustained by the 
evidence gathered. 
Acts of Trust Building. Following Nasi (2002: 365-367), the relative lack of acts of trust building from 
either warring faction characterized the peace process of El Salvador, and explains the critical role of 
the UN in generating enough trust in both parties so that a final agreement could be reached. 
Admittedly, for army officers and FMLN commanders, military operations that involved human right 
violations were mostly an instrument to force their counterpart to agree with political demands during 
the entire process.  
Two significant acts of human rights violations seemed to have negligible effects to the pace of the 
negotiations (cf. Karl 1992; Munck 1993). First, the FMLN carried out a military offensive among 
harmless civilians that included the use of land-to-air missiles in May 1990. In return, the Salvadorian 
army performed another military offensive using disproportionate force. Yet, besides De Soto’s 
ferocious criticism about these actions, they are not discussed in the literature as a probable cause for 
the subsequent negotiation’s deadlock. At best, it could be inferred that they explain why the FMLN 
assumed an even more radical position towards the topics of dissolving the army and impunity.  
Secondly, according to Martínez Peñate (2011), during the first weeks of 1991, the FMLN abducted 
one of the sons of a highly influential businessman in El Salvador but soon released him upon De 
Soto’s intervention in March 1991. One possible explanation as to why this is barely considered an 
action that affected the peace process could lay in the fact that before and after the release of the 
victim negotiations were deadlocked. Additionally, there is no official record to provide evidence that 
either party used the kidnapping as an excuse to exacerbate or underpin their radical positions and 
hence continue with the gridlock. A second possible (cynical) explanation for this may stem from the 
manner in which war was conducted in El Salvador: given that abductions happened often and that this 
was one among many, it may have been seen as a marginal crime. Besides, as it was mentioned above, 
at this point the process was deadlocked over the discussion of critical constitutional reforms. This, in 
turn, takes this question back to Nasi’s interview with a Salvadoran General who considered the lack 
of peace gestures as instruments to force compliance with political demands and who saw nothing 
immoral negotiating and applying force simultaneously (2002: 367).  
Lastly, just as it was the case in Guatemala, it is important to consider the electoral participation of the 
democratic left in the elections and legislature as a possible act of trust-building in terms of human 
rights. Despite the pressure from the international community on El Salvador’s government, in the 
period 1989-1991, human rights violations –including violence against politically salient civilian 
groups- were still a common practice. For instance, according to McClintock (1998: 113-114), during 
this period social movements reported that 36 of their members had been killed. Nonetheless, if one 
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considers that in March 1991 the democratic left attained 12% of the total vote and eight seats for the 
national legislature – a substantial improvement compared to the less than 4% and no seats gained in 
the previous election (Munk 1993: 82), it could be argued that the rights to freely associate and 
participate in politics improved, especially since the frontrunners of these groups were political and 
guerrilla leaders who lived in the exile until the late 1980s. It may be again a cynical idea, but the fact 
that they were rightfully allowed to participate could be taken as a token of goodwill with regard to 
human rights. Yet, there seems to be no evidence that this alleged improvement had any impact on the 
pace of the negotiations which were stalled over the issue of the constitutional reforms.  
As Nasi (2002: 365) points out, in the case of El Salvador there were few acts of trust-building, if any. 
Moreover, there seemed to have been (a few) other actions that would normally cause damage to trust-
building process and that involved human rights violations, but none of them have been considered to 
have an influence in the negotiations. As it was discussed above, the two cases of human rights 
violations that had all the potential to jettison the peace negotiations or stall them appeared to have a 
negligible effect in the process’ pace. Lastly, the relative improvement that could have stemmed from 
the absence of repression of political opposition seemed to have effect on the May gridlock. In short, 
there seems to be no evidence to argue that the speed of peace negotiations of El Salvador was 
affected by the existence of acts of trust building vis-à-vis human rights. 
Case Comparison: Do the Hypotheses Hold?  
Given the discussions presented above, at this point it may be tempting to believe that disputes over 
placing human rights in the first place in the agenda of negotiations; to reach an agreement to stop, 
neutralize, dismantle or sanction the causes and perpetrators of human rights violations , and the 
existence of acts of trust building (or their opposite) vis-á-vis human rights, hurt to a greater extent the 
speed of the Guatemalan negotiations. But as lengthy as this process was, the gridlocks caused by 
discrepancies about human rights account for only 56% of the total time of the process, whereas the 
same issue stalled the Salvadorian negotiations 71% of the total time of the process. In other words, 
while it took 65 months to sign the Accords of Guatemala and these were deadlocked for 37 months  
due to discrepancies with regard human rights; the Salvadorian Chapultepec Accords needed 21 
months to be signed but were stalled for 15 months over the same issue.  
The hypotheses proposed above help to explain these findings. For one thing, in both cases 
negotiations started only because the topic of human rights had the first place in the agenda. As it was 
shown above, in both cases it was not possible to have any other topic negotiated until the issue of 
human rights was cleared. Once an agreement on this issue was reached, the rest of the negotiations 
advanced without extreme difficulties. The Guatemalan three-year deadlock and subsequent fruitful 
negotiations suggest so. 
32 
 
The case of El Salvador is slightly different but it can be said that the same logic applies here: even 
though an agreement about the corps was a key component of the whole human rights discussion, the 
FMLN and the government were willing the discuss the other topics of the agenda only once the 
agreement on human rights took place. The facts that in the beginning the process only moved on after 
De Soto proposed a partial agreement on human rights to the parts, and the ten-month gridlock over a 
full human rights agreement and the army’s reforms seem to confirm this assertion. 
Secondly, the previous findings overlap with those proposed by the second hypothesis. In the case of 
El Salvador, lack of agreement with regard to handling human rights violations and perpetrators 
explains for the most part its first gridlock and, given that the issue was spread throughout the entire 
process, it also explains why negotiations stalled later on time and again. As it was illustrated above, 
despite its limitations, the human rights initial agreement signed with the San Jose Accord saved the 
negotiations from a imminent collapse. For this reason it could be argued that an agreement to put a 
stop to human rights violations has an effect on the speed of peace negotiations , and in this case this 
was what kept the process moving. Conversely, it could be argued that failure to neutralize, dismantle 
and sanction the responsible for human rights violations caused the negotiations to stall: only until the 
very end when the agreement on sanctioning the army officials responsible for human rights violation 
was reached the final accord was signed.  
The case of Guatemala had an inverse dynamic: once the government and MINUGUA complied with 
the agreement to neutralize and dismantle the responsible for human rights violations, the process 
gained outstanding speed. Moreover, as it was shown, the fact that for the first time there was no 
political repression or exclusion during the 1996 elections -along with the left’s electoral winning- had 
an significant effect on the speed of the negotiations. That the negotiations took second place to the 
national elections supports this assertion.  
Lastly, the evidence to support the third hypothesis is mixed. In the case of Guatemala, acts of good 
will vis-à-vis human rights gained the negotiations momentum and brought them forward. However, 
as fluent as the negotiations went, the abduction of a cit izen by the URNG was enough to deadlock 
and put in danger the entire progress. In short, in the case of Guatemala the third hypothesis seems to 
explain the sudden changes in the speed of the negotiation. 
Nevertheless, the case of El Salvador does not provide evidence to support this hypothesis. Acts of 
trust building (or their opposite) seem to have had a negligible effect in the speed of these negotiations: 
Partly because there were few, if any, gestures of good will vis-à-vis human rights, and partly because 
those acts that could have been used to break the already deadlocked negotiations did not have the 
expected consequences. Admittedly, from the rationale that this paper proposed, actions that damage 
trust (such as actions of war that directly violate human rights) should slow down –or jettisoned, if 
already stalled- peace negotiations. However, the abduction mentioned, and the disproportionate use of 
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violence among civilians had no visible effect in the speed of the negotiations (or so seems to show the 
evidence gathered). 
Recommendations for Policy 
Another objective of this paper is to provide new tools for policy on conflict resolution. Based on the 
lessons drawn from both cases as well as the evidence gathered to support the hypotheses proposed, it 
could be suggested that the topic of human rights needs to be considered as a factor that has significant 
implications to the dynamics of peace negotiations. Certainly, this is only one of many important 
aspects that should be taken into account in order to have successful peace negotiations, especially if 
the needs of the warring parties as well as the nature of the war to which a settlement is needed differ 
from that of the cases here explored. But this approach is not intended to become the philosopher’s 
stone for conflict resolution studies and processes; it only seeks to provide tool options to deal with a 
factor that is not yet sufficiently explored. 
The evidence collected suggests that for both cases of peace negotiations, human rights issues 
exceeded in importance the structural social and economic problems that caused the wars in the first 
place. Hence it is suggested that for future peace processes human rights have the priority in the 
agenda. For instance, given the fact that both states were specially designed to exert the most brutal 
repression, it would make sense to assume that human rights were the most important concern for the 
rebels. The evidence presented in this paper shows that the most critical moments of these negotiations 
occurred while discussing this topic and not others. In the end, these groups could always hope to 
achieve a significant social and economic change for their societies within the new negotiated political 
order, especially if it provides guarantees for political contestation.  
As it can be learned from these cases, a collapse in the negotiation is more probable to occur when 
there are disagreements in this regard. For this reason, it could be proposed that in order to increase the 
chances to have a successful outcome in peace negotiations, a discussion and agreement upon human 
rights needs to take the first place in the agenda. For one thing, precisely because of the nature of an 
agreement of this nature, armed conflicts may deescalate which, in turn, could foster trust in a political 
settlement. Second, peace negotiations are one expensive business: they are costly financially and 
politically for both parties and for those who intend to mediate or moderate. A negotiation’s collapse 
due to profound discrepancies with regard of the part’s obligations to respect and defend human rights, 
serves as an unquestionable indicator that different, perhaps more radical, measures are needed and 
that the investments mentioned above need to be made somewhere else. Besides, if two –or more- 
parties cannot come to an agreement in this regard, it is much less likely that they will honor other 
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accords over issues that affect their political and economic resources. Thus, by discussing the issue of 
human rights first all parties may make sure that their investments in the process are worth it. 
Given the importance of an agreement on human rights, the second recommendation has to do with 
mechanisms to increase the chances of making this agreement possible. The literature about Conflict 
Resolution has already made significant progress in this regard and has provided us with evidence 
about the extent to which different mechanisms of transitional justice have effects on peace 
negotiations and their aftermath. In effect, as it was shown here as well, for warring parties the sourest 
part of these sorts of agreements comes when they discuss eventual criminal punishments and Truth 
Commissions that have the actual power to condemn those responsible for crimes against humanity 
and human rights violations. For this reason, it could be suggested that in these kinds of negotiations 
the first step needs to be an agreement on military and political purges and compromises to 
immediately stop violating human rights. The rationale behind this proposal is as follows: Based on 
the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador, it could be argued that when these two conditions were met, 
both peace negotiations became more stable and moved forward. For the most part, those who were in 
favor of and looked forward to a peaceful settlement became the dominant stream after political and 
military purges took place and weakened the processes’ spoilers as well as isolated them. In turn, this 
gained the process stability and allowed the negotiators to agree on a full stop of practices that directly 
violated human rights. 
One last recommendation for policy is that warring parties are advised to unilaterally promote human 
rights or stop violating them. Despite the fact that the evidence provided by this paper is mixed, there 
are good reasons to assume that this could bring peace negotiations forward in other cases. First, acts 
of this nature can only strengthened the party’s good reputation before the international community 
whom in turn may put pressure on the other part to act likewise. As a result, the armed conflict may 
deescalate causing the negotiations to move forward. Second, a warring party that performs actions 
that promote and/or defend human rights may become popular among civilians and gain their 
endorsement. Since it can be assumed that no party wants to be seen as the ‘bad guy’ before his 
community, the other party may reciprocate the gesture, create sympathy between the parties, gain the 
negotiations momentum and bring them to a satisfactory ending.  
These recommendations may not be feasible for all types of peace negotiations but they certainly 
invite policy makers or moderators to consider the topic human rights as a relevant factor for the 
negotiation process as such. Human rights issues need to be also considered as strategic bargaining 
chips because not only do they show the warring parties willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement, 
they also foster and motivate cooperation at the bargaining table.  
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Conclusion  
This paper aimed to show that human rights violations matter for peace processes. They do not only 
matter for their intrinsic value nor do they only matter because they draw international attention and 
pressure to the warring parts. The also matter because they can and do make peace negotiations 
difficult.  
This paper intended to provide evidence for that assertion: by looking at the changes of the speed of 
the peace negotiations, it was possible to determine that negotiations reached their slowest pace when 
there were substantial disagreements between the parties about the issue of human rights. Put 
differently, here it was contended that by analyzing the speed of peace negotiations it was possible to 
determine the importance that the topics negotiated had for the parties. It was assumed that if a 
bargaining round had no deadlocks, then the issue discussed did not strike the parties as indivisible. By 
contrast, a topic was considered difficult to negotiate when negotiations moved slowly or stalled. 
Surprisingly, in the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, negotiations stalled especially over the issue 
of human rights – not exactly the main cause of these civil wars.  
Appendix A. Counterfactual Analysis  
This paper was mostly inspired by the current peace negotiations that are being held in Cuba between 
the Colombian government and the guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC). The bargaining rounds started on October 17 2012. Despite the fact that these peace 
negotiations are being held in secret, some information about them can be found in the public domain. 
The majority of the reports discuss the agreements reached so far at the bargaining table and the topics 
that are being negotiated at the moment. The dynamics of the negotiations, however, can be inferred 
by looking at the parts’ official statements and by what the media reports –at best.  
Nonetheless, and contrary to the cases discussed in this paper, it is clear that these negotiations did not 
have the topic of human rights as a starter. While it is not yet quite clear if there have been significant 
deadlocks in the past (the first two topics discussed were a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform and 
Political Participation), at present (since February 2015) Colombian media and the FARC’s media 
sources have reported serious disagreements related to the punishments for those responsible for 
crimes against humanity and human rights violations
11
. Particularly, it is said that negotiations stalled  
when it came down to discussing imprisonment for FARC members and a Truth Commission. While 
based one media reports it could be assumed that the process is far from collapsing over this deadlock, 
                                                 
11
 See, for example,  
http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/santos-un-proceso-con-total-impunidad-es-imposible/423417-3 ; 
http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/impunidad-farc-proyecto-de-fiscalia-articulo-561308 ; 
http://www.abc.es/internacional/20150331/abci-colombia-entrevista-embajador%20fernando-carrillo-dialogo-farc-201503291819.html 
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the situation does invite one to think if the process would have been concluded already had this issue 
been discussed first.  
Human rights is one hard topic to discuss and failure to come to an agreement about it may jettison the 
entire process. The State in this case is the one who, allegedly, is to bring justice and sanction FARC 
members responsible for human rights violations and crimes against humanity. Yet, after almost 1000 
day of negotiations the FARC may be willing to risk the process if they do not get impunity/amnesty. 
For the government. breaking the process at this point is probably the most hurtful option because its 
reputation and political viability depend to a large extent on it. The fact that the previous presidential 
elections (2014) revolved around the continuation of this process and not the economy or corruption 
speaks for itself. Besides, peace negotiations are an expensive business: the longer they take, the more 
they cost (politically and financially). If this kind of topics have all the potential to jettison an entire 
process, it is best to discuss them first. If the process breaks because no agreement on it is reached, the 
losses are comparatively less or marginal compared to those if the negotiations collapse after 1000 
days.  
On a second note, there have been actions that violate human rights in this process and this may 
support the third hypothesis of this paper. In Novemeber 2014, the FARC kidnapped an Air Force 
General, which caused a crisis and lead the negotiations to a gridlock
12
. The cause of the kidnap is still 
a matter of debate as it occurred in rather obscure circumstances. The general was released after two 
weeks and the parts resumed the negotiations. However, in addition to almost breaking the 
negotiations, this abduction caused more polarization towards the entire process (see Diálogos de Paz
13
) 
Lastly, it could be the case that they moved at a faster pace when the guerrilla group declared an 
unilateral ceasefire last year, but then again, so far there is no evidence in the public domain to 
corroborate that assertion.  
From these three experiences can be inferred that the HR topic is perhaps one of the most strategic 
chips of bargain. In the two cases analyzed, it discussed first with the purpose of changing the 
correlation of power and neutralizes the state. In the case of Colombia is being negotiated last so that 
the rebels can put pressure on the government to agree to their political demands in this regards or risk 
1000 days of negotiations.  
 
                                                 
12
 See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30103395  
           http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30281654 
13
 http://dialogosdepaz.org/ 
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